The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of natural selection. One of its limitations, however, is that it does not capture the notion of long-run stability when the system is subjected to stochastic effects. We define the concept of stability in a stochastic dynamical system, and show that it differs from both the traditional ESS and the concept of an attractor in a dynamical system. The stochastically stable set may be computed analytically using recent advances in potential theory.
1.

Introduction
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) has become one of the principal tools for analyzing the dynamics of natural selection. The essential idea is that a population is ÒstableÓ if it cannot be invaded by a small number of individuals playing a different strategy (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) .
1 Since small perturbations due to mutations and other chance events are almost inevitable, stability requires that any small deviation from the equilibrium state be selfcorrecting. The system should, over time, evolve back to the equilibrium situation.
As various authors have pointed out, however, this definition does not capture the full meaning of dynamical stability. We need to view the evolution of population frequencies as a dynamical system. In this framework in ESS represents only one type of stable outcome, other asymptotic regimes such as limit cycles and strange attractors must also be considered (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Zeeman, 1979; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983 , 1986 , Sigmund, 1987 .
In this paper we shall argue that neither evolutionarily stable strategies nor the more general idea of attractors is quite the right concept of dynamical stability in a biological context. What is missing is an adequate account of stochastic effects. This is not to say that stochastic elements are ignored in these models, only that they are not fully taken into account. For example, the ESS criterion says that any small perturbation to the system will eventually die out. The limitation of this definition is that it treats each perturbation as if it were an isolated event. In reality, a system is continually being subjected to small perturbations that arise through mutations, as well as ordinary chance events that affect the reproductive success of individuals. This distinction between continual and isolated stochastic influences is fundamental. If each successive perturbation dies out (or almost dies out) before the next one is felt, then obviously the system can never move very far from its ÒequilibriumÓ position, and the ESS definition of stability remains valid.
But this situation must be considered quite exceptional. If stochastic effects operate continually on the system, then even if they are arbitrarily small they may qualitatively change the long-run outcome. The reason is that, over the long run, it is likely that some succession of perturbations will accumulate and kick the system out of any immediate locus of an ESS. How soon the system eventually returns to this particular ESS depends on the global structure of the dynamical process. In a stochastic setting, then, the ESS condition is insufficient as a criterion of stability because it is only a local criterion.
The notion of an attractor in dynamical systems theory comes closer to a full description of dynamical stability. Yet even this model is not sufficient for two reasons. First, the limiting behavior of the system may depend on the assumed starting point. Second, only certain states in the attractor set may be stochastically stable. Which states are ÒselectedÓ depends on the specific structure of the stochastic process.
In this paper we propose a general definition of stability in a stochastic dynamical system. 2 Roughly speaking, a state P is a stochastically stable equilibrium (SSE) if, in the long run, it is nearly certain that the system lies within every small neighborhood of P as the noise tends slowly to zero. 3 More generally the stochastically stable set (SSS) is the set of states S such that, in the long run, it is nearly certain that the system 2 A different approach is taken by Hines (1980 Hines ( , 1982 who studies stability issues created by mutation. 3 If one had an exact estimate of the noise term (say from biological data) then there would be no need to consider the limit as the noise tends to zero: we could study the behavior of the limiting distribution as
lies within every open set containing S as the noise tends slowly to zero.
The stochastically stable set is always nonempty. But it is by no means equivalent to the set of evolutionary stable strategies even when the latter exist. Often only a subset of the evolutionarily stable strategies are stochastically stable. In some cases none of them may be stochastically stable.
Our major point is to show that the introduction of stochastic effects may qualitatively change the asymptotic behavior of an evolutionary system. Second, we
give a precise definition of the stochastically stable set, and show that it minimizes a suitably defined potential function. The potential function can be used to explicitly compute the stochastically stable set, as we show by example.
Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
We begin with the following model due to Taylor and Jonker (1978) . Let a population consist of finitely many distinct phenotypes i = 1, 2, É, n. Each phenotype is associated with a fixed Òstrategy.Ó Let
denote the relative proportions of the n phenotypes in the total population at time t. p(t) is a state of the system. The model of selection is as follows. Individuals continually meet each other in random encounters. Whenever an individual of type-i meets an individual of type-j, the ÒpayoffÓ to i is a ij where the payoff is measured in terms of the change in iÕs Darwinian Fitness: after an encounter between i and j, iÕs reproductive rate is increased by the amount a ij .
time goes to infinity. In the absence of information on the variance, however, it makes sense to consider the limiting behavior of the system when the noise is very small but nonvanishing.
Given the proportions p(t), and assuming a large number of (instantaneous) random encounters between types, the current rate of increase for i can be written
. The average rate of increase of the whole population is r t p t a p t
. The relative rate of increase in the frequency of i is given by the replicator equation (1) where A is the n n × matrix of payoffs ( a ij ).
The biological model on which the replicator equation is based is inherently stochastic in nature. Obviously, not every encounter between a type-i individual and a type-i individual results in exactly the same change in fitness. In reality, the change in reproductive fitness resulting from chance encounters is a random variable, and a ij is its expectation. If the population of each type is very large, and encounters are frequent in every brief time period, then the variance of a ij will be very small, so Eq.
(1) will be a good approximation of the path that the system follows at each time t.
Nevertheless, it is only an approximation. Furthermore, a real biological system is subject to all sorts of other random effects (in addition to changes in fitness resulting from encounters) such as variability in mating success, foraging success, infant mortality, and so forth.
While most authors acknowledge the existence of such stochastic influences, they have generally assumed that their effect on the outcome is so small as to be negligible. For example, Peck and Feldman (1988) assert that Òthe population size and the number of offspring produced per female are sufficiently large to allow us to
ignore stochastic effects.Ó While this assumption may be reasonable in some
situations, we shall demonstrate that, in general, even if the stochastic effects are arbitrarily small, they may qualitatively change the asymptotic behavior of the system. Hence they cannot be ignored.
The stochastic terms arise from a variety of factors. Our goal is to study the asymptotic behavior of (2) asσ converges to zero. In particular we are interested in the connection between the limiting behavior of (2) and the ESS of the system (if any exist). We shall find that the introduction of a vanishingly small noise term often causes the system to ÒselectÓ among the ESS: some of the ESS may be stochastically stable, while others are not. Furthermore, in some systems, none of the ESS are stochastically stable.
A precise definition and characterization of the stochastically stable set is deferred to the next section. First we illustrate the ideas by several elementary examples.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following symmetric payoff matrix:
5 Roughly speaking, the boundary is "reflecting" if the process bounces off of it according to the equal angles law. This is how it would be simulated in discrete time for example. See Karlin and Taylor (1975) for a more precise statement.
dp t p t A t dt t A t dt d t
This game describes a situation where being like everyone else is desirable. If most of the population is playing strategy 1 then it is better to play 1, whereas if most of the population is playing 2, then it is better to also play 2. The population on the whole grows faster, however, if everyone plays 2. The ESS of this game are the states all-1 and all-2, as the reader may easily verify. These are also the Nash equilibria of the two-person game A and the attractors of the corresponding dynamical system (1). 6 (6)
[6 Ð If both players play strategy one with probability 2/3, then this is a Nash equilibrium, but it is unstable.]
Now let us examine the asymptotic behavior of the system when a small noise term is introduced. Let p(t) be the proportion of the population playing 1 and 1 Ð p(t) the proportion playing 2. Pick ∆ > 0, and consider the state
Assume for simplicity that the noise is uniform over the state space and over time.
Thus we are considering the equation (3) where W(t) is normal (0, t). We shall study the evolution of the system as the variance σ 2 becomes arbitrarily small. 6 If both players play strategy one with probability Figure 1 shows a simulated sample path for i between zero and 100 with the process starting at p 0 1 2 = and σ = 0 6 . . As t increases there are frequent transitions from a population playing nearly all-1 to a population playing nearly all 2. The system spends more time near all-2 than it does near all-1 but it does not appear to converge to a ∆ -neighborhood of the all-2 state.
dp t p t p t p t p t
This is confirmed when we examine the limiting distribution of p(t). As t → ∞, the probability of finding the population near any given value p ∈ − ( )
is positive, and the limiting distribution f σ p ( ) is independent of the starting point of the paths.
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(This is a general feature of many stochastic models, and one of their great analytical advantages: the asymptotic behavior of the system does not depend in any essential way on the initial state.) Figure 2 shows the distribution f σ p ( ) for the σ -values 0.6, 0.4, and 0.2. As σ goes to zero, the probability becomes increasingly concentrated near p = ∆ . In other words, the state p = ∆ (all type-2 except for the new mutants) is a stochastically stable equilibrium. 7 The existence of the limiting distribution is assured because Γ p ( ) is bounded away from zero for all Why is the mostly all-2 state selected over the mostly all-1 state, even though both are ESS and both are stable attractors? Intuitively the explanation is the following.
Suppose that most of the population is playing strategy 1 (i.e., p ≅ − 1 ∆). Against this population an organism playing I will get a payoff of four (on average) whereas an organism playing strategy 2 will get a payoff of zero. Since most organisms are playing 1, the average payoff for everyone is about four. Thus, there is selection pressure against any organism playing strategy 2. In orderÕ for the population to switch to playing strategy 2, the number of type-2 players must grow (due to random drift) in spite of being disadvantaged. Once the number playing 2 is more than onethird of the population, selection well tend to drive the population towards type-2.
A similar story holds for the transition from mostly type-2 players to mostly type-1.
But this transition is harder because the selection pressure against it is stronger.
Hence it is less likely. In summary, the population will fluctuate between being mostly type-I and being mostly type-2. But when most of the population is playing 2, it takes longer to switch to 1 than vice versa. Furthermore, the difference in transition times becomes larger as the noise term becomes weaker. So, as σ → 0, the probability that almost everyone is playing strategy 2 approaches unity.
Example 2. Consider the matrix This is like Example 1 except that a third strategy has been added. This new strategy is dominated by the second one: playing strategy 2 gives at least as high a payoff as playing strategy 3 no matter what strategy the opponent plays. While this inferior strategy is not itself selected, it has the effect of destabilizing the previous equilibrium and shifting the outcome from nearly all-2 to nearly all-1. The reason is this: the presence of a small number of 3Õs gives an extra boost to the 1Õs, but not to themselves or to the 2Õs. If the 2Õs start to grow, then they help boost the number of 3Õs, which in turn boosts the number of 1Õs. Thus a chance movement away from all-1, say towards 2, triggers the ÒcatalyticÓ sequence 2 3 1 → → , and the system is pushed back toward the all-1 state. The basins of attraction are such that it is harder for the system to drift away from the mostly all-1 state than from the mostly all-2 state.
This example shows that the SSE is not necessarily the ESS having the highest. growth rate. Stochastic stability does not imply that the reproductive rate is maximized.
Example 3. In this example we show that there may exist no SSE. Rather, there is a set of points that is asymptotically stable. Consider the matrix
The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is
however, because from any interior point other than N, the deterministic dynamical system spirals outward and converges to a limit cycle (see Fig. 3 ). The specific shape of this cycle depends, of course, on the value of the mutation rate ∆ . As ∆ becomes smaller, it approximates the boundary of S ∆ more and more closely. Now fix ∆ > 0 and introduce a small level of noise. The limiting density of the process is concentrated in a small envelope containing this limit cycle, and the limit cycle is the asymptotically stable set of the stochastic process. However, as ∆ becomes smaller the limiting density is increasingly concentrated in the ÒcornersÓ of the limit cycle. In other words, if both ∆ and σ are sufficiently small, the probability is almost one that the process is within ε of one of the three corners. The dynamics of the process are as follows. Typically it is near a comer and lingers there for a long time.
Occasionally, it skitters alongside the boundary toward the next comer, where it loiters for another long period of time. This new type imposes a negative payoff on each of the others (and vice versa) but it is harmless against itself. If type 4 is sufficiently numerous, then it has the highest relative reproduction rate, and the process converges to all-4. Therefore it is an ESS, and in fact it is the unique one. If, on the other hand, type 4 falls below some critical proportion of the population, then they are disadvantaged relative to -the others and the process converges to the limit cycle described in the previous example. Furthermore this second basin of attraction is the dominant one for the stochastic process.
As the noise goes to zero, the process is almost certain to be in the limit-cycle regime, and type 4 will almost have died out. Thus the process is typically nowhere near the unique ESS of the system.
THE STOCHASTICALLY STABLE SET
The preceding examples show that stochastic stability is a more refined idea than either attractors or evolutionarily stable strategies. We now give a formal definition.
Let f σ ⋅
